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Abstract
The eﬃciency defence was long delayed in the European merger control due
to costly implementation issues. In this paper we argue that the upstream con-
sequences of the eﬃciency defence should equally be considered, namely the im-
provement of the distribution of notified mergers through the incentives it provides
towards more eﬃcient mergers. First of all, we show that even if the Competi-
tion Authority may not tell apart the mergers that rightfully invoke the eﬃciency
defence from those that do not, allowing such a procedure can lead to a lower
post-merger price. Secondly, we study the impact of merger remedies on the in-
centives conveyed by the eﬃciency defence, and conclude on the optimal design
of the eﬃciency defence procedure.
Keywords: merger control, eﬃciency defence, merger remedies
JEL classification: L41, K21, D82
Résumé
La procedure d’"eﬃciency defence" a été jusqu’à recemment absente de la
législation européenne sur le contrôle des fusions en raison des problèmes pratiques
d’implementation qu’elle soulevait. Notre propos dans ce papier est de rappeller
qu’au délà de ces problèmes, des eﬀets incitatifs positifs sont à attendre lors de
l’application de cette procedure, notamment dans le sens d’encourager les firmes
à entreprendre des fusions plus eﬃcaces. Dans un premier temps, on démontre
que l’espérance de prix peut baisser avec cette procedure, en dépit de l’asymétrie
d’information qui caracterise la relation de contrôle des fusions entre l’autorité de
la concurrence et les firmes fusionnantes. Ensuite, on prolonge notre analyse des
eﬀets incitatifs en amont de l’"eﬃciency defence" en y ajoutant un outil largement
utilisé actuellement, les remèdes. Ainsi, dans un deuxième temps on caractérise le
contrôle optimal des fusions en termes des deux procedures : "eﬃciency defence"
et remèdes des fusions.
Mots-clé: contrôle des fusions, procedure d’"eﬃciency defence", remèdes des
fusions
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1. Introduction
Merger control was designed as a firewall against anticompetitive mergers, but
diﬀerent competition authorities typically held diﬀerent views of merger control.
While some countries allowed eﬃciency gains to be explicitly taken into account
for the merger assessment1, others rather overlooked them. It is not until recently
that an explicit Eﬃciency Defence2 (ED henceforth) began to apply for European
mergers3, so for the time being little can be inferred in terms of firms’ reaction to
this new regulation.
Taking into account the upstream consequences of the ED, not only its down-
stream consequences in terms of costs due to its application, amounts to adopt-
ing a diﬀerent standpoint on the role of the merger control: not only rejecting
anticompetitive mergers, but also providing incentives for mergers to be more
pro-competitive in the first place. The assessment of merger control ought to
account for this double purpose addressed by the merger control instruments or
procedures, namely both preventing the anticompetitive eﬀects and promoting
the upstream incentive towards more competitive mergers.
This article claims that allowing an ED ought to improve the outcome of the
merger control to the extent that it gives firms incentives to undertake more ef-
ficient mergers than they would otherwise attempt, and this is preferable for the
Competition Authority (CA from now on), given its objective of Consumers’ Sur-
plus maximization. This result may seem intuitive. The analysis performed in
our paper is nevertheless more involved, since we equally discuss the opportunity
for the CA to apply remedies together with the ED. To our knowledge, no work
has been attempted so far with respect to the optimal merger policy mix be-
tween divestitures and the ED procedure, which is the second objective our paper
addresses.
The model we propose focuses on firms’ decision in terms of choice of merger
to undertake, and basically claims that the ED clause will alter the distribution of
1Such as France, Canada, Australia or New Zealand.
2Broadly speaking, the ED involves the global assessment of both positive and negative
merger eﬀects, for the declared purpose of improving the merger control outcome.
3See the Council Regulation (EC) No 139/2004 of 20 January 2004 on the control of concen-
trations between undertakings (the EC Merger Regulation) - Oﬃcial Journal L 24, 29.01.2004,
paragraph (29), p.4: "In order to determine the impact of a concentration on competition in the
common market, it is appropriate to take account of any substantiated and likely eﬃciencies put
forward by the undertakings concerned.[...] The Commission should publish guidance on the
conditions under which it may take eﬃciencies into account in the assessment of concentration."
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notified mergers for the better. Firms may choose ex ante between diﬀerent merger
opportunities, more or less eﬃcient. However, the design of an eﬃcient merger
requires a costly eﬀort, which moreover is private information for the merger
partners. The CA has the choice between applying or not the ED, meaning that
it may or not take into account the possibility of eﬃciency gains as an argument
for clearing the merger. We find that allowing the ED can be optimal, despite the
fact that the CA has imperfect information on the eﬃciency outcome of mergers,
thanks to the eﬀort provision incentive eﬀect. In the end, the expected price can
be lower with the ED merger control, should all firms eventually submit the same
type of merger.
Concerning the application of remedies, we remind that on the one hand, the
use of divestiture injunctions is meant to prevent any price raise following the
merger, which is clearly an advantage given the asymmetric information setting.
On the other hand, remedies soften the threat of blocking a merger, in as much as
firms avoid with certainty the status-quo situation, and this encourages them to
run the risk of unrightfully applying for the ED procedure4. Our model accounts
for the impact of merger remedies on the ED procedure, and thereby studies the
optimal design of the ED, depending on the quality of information available to the
CA. Based on the likelihood of the eﬀort provision, which we take to be the neces-
sary condition to obtain the lowest price, the CA is likely to prefer the stricter ED
without remedy when good information is available, whereas associating remedy
to the ED is desirable when the risk of error is high. This is worth pointing out,
since it implies that despite a substantial risk of error, the CA might nevertheless
prefer to tolerate the pooling outcome induced by the ED with remedy, in order
to provide higher eﬀort incentives5. To put it diﬀerently, for low quality signals,
the flexible ED (with divestiture) yields the highest eﬀort incentives, whereas with
high quality signals, the strict ED does so instead.
Consequently, in terms of optimal merger control, we find that for low levels
of the eﬀort cost, the CA always requires remedy, coupled with or without an
4Actually, the use of remedies is often acknowledged as a signal of a "soft" merger policy -
see Seldeslachts et al. (2006) for a recent test and confirmation of this hypothesis.
5In the field of patent law and innovation policy, a similar eﬀort incentive eﬀect was high-
lighted by Caillaud and Duchene (2004), who discuss the overload problem faced by the US
patent oﬃce. They find that the optimal patent examination process should accept a number
of "bad" patents within a pooling equilibrium, since it encourages the up-stream R&D, so that
more "good" patents would eventually be granted. In our framework, even though all firms
might eventually submit the same type of merger, the ED procedure can be optimal provided
it gives upstream incentives to exert the eﬀort needed to lower the market price.
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ED, depending on the available information quality. In turn, the strict ED can be
optimal for higher levels of the eﬀort cost, in which case there is conflict between
the ED and the divestiture. For a given eﬀort decision on behalf of insiders, the
divestiture is actually preferred by both the CA and the merging firms. Yet, for a
range of high eﬀort cost, it actually does not convey the highest eﬀort incentive,
hence the above-mentioned conflict.
As before mentioned, this article basically underlines that a given merger regu-
lation is likely to change the distribution of mergers to which it eventually applies.
The same intuition is exploited by Barros (2003), who analyzes the change in the
design of cooperative agreements induced by the shift from an ex-ante to an ex-
post control regime under the European Commission reform of the Communitary
competition policy6. More recently, Ecer (2005) argues that it does make sense
to assume that merging firms react to the existing merger control provisions, and
that they design merger projects accordingly7. He shows that the tendency to
apply a stricter merger policy may prove ineﬀective, since firms endowed with
rational expectations are able to bypass it by devising strategies to sustain higher
market prices in equilibrium.
Concerning merger policy8, Besanko and Spulber remarked as early as 1993
that "the size and type of firms that contemplate mergers are determined not only
by the anticipated returns from the merger but also by antitrust merger enforce-
ment". However, the main purpose of their article was to study the consequences
of the information asymmetry about the merger’s eﬃciency gains for the formula-
tion and enforcement of merger control. The opportunity of an ED was actually
long debated9 because of its associated implementation costs. Indeed, the main
argument against the ED procedure was the prohibitive cost of information acqui-
sition due to the context of asymmetric information for the CA. Without perfect
information, the ED procedure raises the question of the costly verification of
those alleged eﬃciency gains. Lagerlöf and Heidhues (2005) explicitly deal with
this issue, and identify the conditions under which the cost trade-oﬀ does warrant
6See also Bergès-Sennou et al. on the same topic, but from an opposite standpoint.
7Neven et al.(1993) equally note that merger control may result in "[...] mergers that would
otherwise be attractive to firms, but that they do not even try to undertake because of fear that
they will not be approved [...] or in transactions that may take place in a form diﬀerent from
that that they would have taken in the absence of regulation" - Mergers in Daylight, p. 137.
8See also Seldeslachts et al (2006), who briefly review the literature suggesting that the
merger policy instruments do have upstream eﬀects on firms’ merging projects, before testing
for the deterrence eﬀects of these instruments.
9See Ilzkovitz and Meiklejohn (2001) for a survey of this topic.
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the desirability of an ED. Their results claim that an ED is not worth while if it is
too costly for society as a whole, through the evidence production costs it entails
on behalf of merging firms. We choose to neglect here the cost side of the debate,
only to better focus on the analysis of the eﬀort-provision incentive eﬀect of the
ED procedure.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. We present next the model,
then discuss eﬃciency defence as an incentive device. The last section concludes.
2. The Model
2.1. Technology and market structure
We consider a simple though general framework consisting of competition be-
tween four firms. They are identical indivisible entities, using the same cost
technology. Given that mergers to monopoly are prohibited by law, two types of
alternative mergers can possibly occur, of either two or three partners. We spec-
ify our ED setting so that these two types allow for both more or less profitable
mergers, on the one hand, and also for more or less anticompetitive mergers on the
other. For that, we shall consider a group of three firms who jointly decide whether
to attempt a 3-firm merger or only a 2-firm one, and we allow side-transfers among
firms, so as to deal only with the total profit generated by the group of firms10.
To begin with, mergers typically involve both a market power increase and
some cost savings. This will also be the case here, but we shall only deal with
the net outcome of these two opposing eﬀects, through the merger’s price con-
sequences. This is consistent with the actual ED procedure, which is precisely
supposed to undertake a global merger assessment so as to determine the net ef-
fect. On the one hand, in our framework the choice of merger partners (1 or 2)
will lead to a particular design of the merger project, less or more anticompetitive.
At the same time, we equally assume that the same mergers that have the poten-
tial to raise price can generate merger-specific eﬃciency gains (EG henceforth),
through some costly eﬀort e. More precisely, we assume merger partners to be
able to exert a certain conception eﬀort for the design of their association, which
can hereby increase its pro-competitive potential11. To underline the necessity
10This allows us to discuss the issue of merger choice/design on behalf of the merging firms.
Basically, the merger choice results either form the choice of the identity of merging partners,
or the choice of their number. For simplicity, we chose the second option.
11A possible example of such a context is given by the joint ventures cases that were formerly
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of this beforehand pro-competitive design of the merger, we assume that firms
exerting this eﬀort incur a total fixed sunk cost of F . To put it short, without
this prior eﬀort, the merger can only raise price ex-post. Note that we do not
take these EG to be merger synergies, in as much as the eﬀort required for their
materialization is achievable before the actual integration of merging partners12.
We start next the list of assumptions consistent with the above framework.
Denote Πi the initial stand-alone profit before merger. To establish notations, let
all other profits be expressed with the help of the corresponding market structures.
Let Π (2, 1, 1) +Π (1, 2, 1) be the global profit of three firms going in for a 2-firm
merger, Π (3, 1) the profit of a 3-firm merger without eﬀort, and Π (3e, 1) the
profit of three firms with eﬀort or EG, since we assume the outcome of eﬀort to
be certain.
Assumption 1 - Profits: all mergers are profitable, any 3-firm merger is more
profitable then a 2-firm one, eﬀort increases merger profitability, and there is no
market exit following any of the mergers. In other words, the following hold:
Π (3e, 1) > Π (3, 1) > Π (2, 1, 1) + Π (1, 2, 1) ≥ 3Πi,Π (1, 2, 1) > 0,Π (1, 3e) > 0.
Basically, the higher profitability of 3-firm mergers is justified by their higher
marker power increase. Also, in order to have a consistent trade-oﬀ concerning
the eﬀort choice, let F ≥ Π (3e, 1) − Π (3, 1), otherwise making eﬀort is strictly
dominant for firms.
2.2. Merger control and market structure
To materialize their merger, firms need the approval of the Competition Au-
thority. As far as the latter is concerned, we consider its objective to be Con-
sumers’ Surplus (CS) maximization13. The following assumption describes the
anti-competitive eﬀect of mergers, and hence the CA’s order of preferences:
Assumption 2 - Price order : P (3, 1) > Pi > P (2, 1, 1) > P (3e, 1)
First of all, we assume any 2-firmmerger increases consumers’ surplus, meaning
cleared in Europe under the article 85(3). Typically, the argument of the parties in favour of
their cooperation was the prior costly investment undertaken to smooth technological transfer
and to enhance the complementarities between partners. See for instance Jorde and Teece (1990)
and Shapiro and Willig (1990) for a review of such cases and their anti-trust treatment at the
time.
12Typically synergies can only materialize ex-post, after the merger itself. We do not however
deal with the post-merger eﬀort or incentives to achieve these synergies.
13This is actually more restrictive than the CAs’ current practice, according to which any
merger that does not raise price should be accepted.
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it is a "safe" merger from the CA’s standpoint. This actually occurs in practice
whenever CAs automatically clear mergers that do not increase by much market
concentration and thus do not exceed the limit thresholds computed by the CA.
Implicitly therefore, the cost savings of 2-firm mergers are considered here to
exceed the corresponding market power increase, which makes this merger always
acceptable. In turn, a 3-firm merger without EG is anti-competitive, i.e. price
increases afterwards due to excessive market concentration w.r.t. cost savings,
whereas one with EG lowers the price. Thus, the CA strictly prefers 3-firmmergers
with EG, but should block 3-firm mergers without EG.
We consider an asymmetric information framework for the CA, and assume
that the firms’ eﬀort and its outcome are private information of insiders. Never-
theless, the CA observes an exogenous signal s, imperfectly correlated with the
merger eﬃciency gains. s stands for all relevant hard information that the CA
can use to make its decision, which is typically obtained during the merger review
process. In practice, the CA gathers pieces of information from various sources, its
own expertise, the insiders themselves, the outsiders, even consumers. However,
for the purpose and outcome of our analysis, only the quality of this information
is relevant. Therefore we summarize all this data in an exogenous costless signal,
although in practice the CA spends money and time to evaluate the merger, only
to highlight even more the choice to focus on the incentive properties of the ef-
ficiency defence, and not on its cost side analysis. Finally, for simplicity, let the
signal s ∈ {s, s}, with Pr(s/eﬀort) = Pr(s/no eﬀort) = σ ∈ [1/2, 1]. Based on this
imperfect signal, the CA may very well reject eﬃcient 3-firm mergers, or, on the
contrary, accept anticompetitive ones, hence the possibility for both type I and II
errors.
To maximize CS, the CA decides to allow or not the ED, meaning it can apply
a decision rule for the 3-firm merger approval which may or may not depend on
the signal received. The decision rule is either "any 2-firm merger is accepted,
but a 3-firm merger is accepted only if s", or "any 2-firm merger is accepted and
any 3-firm merger is rejected". The former decision rule allows the ED, the latter
does not.
When challenging a merger, two alternatives are available: the CA can either
reject it downright and thus maintain the status-quo, or it can challenge the
particular form under which the merger is notified, and thus clear the merger
only if the merging firms agree to divest assets. Given the number of firms in
our model and the indivisibility assumption, the divestiture implies the transfer
of one individual plant either to the outsider or to a new entrant. We assume
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here that the CA chooses the asset buyer14, and furthermore that this is the
outsider15. To the extent that remedies represent a supplementary merger control
instrument which, to a certain extent, allows the CA to implement a particular
market structure, we add the following:
Assumption 3: Divestiture price eﬀect : Pi ≥ P (2, 1, 1) > P (2, 2) > P (3e, 1)
In other words, we consider the case of a successful remedy, i.e. one which
prevents the price raise (Pi > P (2, 2)), but which is not more successful than an
eﬃcient 3-firm merger from the CA’s point of view (P (2, 2) > P (3e, 1)), although
it does yield a lower price than a 2-firm one (P (2, 1, 1) > P (2, 2)).
We detail next the consequences of the divestiture decision, since the market
structure and its corresponding payoﬀs are determined both by the firms’ choice
of merger, and by the CA’s decision to require remedy.
On the one hand, Consumers’ Surplus maximization gives the CA incentives to
implement through remedies a lower market price. On the other hand, divestitures
always imply some private cost for insiders, although they equally represent for
them an opportunity to recover part of the positive externality they exert on
the outsider through the merger16. Considering all this, we write the insiders’
payoﬀ in case of divestiture as the revenue from the asset transfer, for which the
insiders make a take-it-or-leave-it oﬀer to the outsider. Hence their payoﬀ equals
2Π (2, 2)−Πi.
To sum up, denote Πr the insiders’ payoﬀ in case of a merger refusal, and call
it their reservation profit. Whenever the CA rejects the merger and maintains the
status-quo, Πr = Πr = 3Πi, whereas if the merger is blocked and divestiture is
required, Πr = Πr = 2Π (2, 2)− Πi. It is straightforward to check that Πr > Πr.
Therefore the CA’s choice to apply or not remedy in case of merger refusal boils
down to allowing or not firms to obtain more than the status-quo profit. The next
assumption completes the framework:
Assumption 4: Divestiture profit eﬀect : Πr < Π (3, 1). In other words, the
remedy does involve a cost for insiders, and guarantees that the CA and the
insiders have conflicting objectives17.
14This comes close to the actual practice of CAs, who preserve a veto right concerning the
choice of the buyer, so to a certain extent they do get to choose its identity.
15This may appear restrictive, but the point of our model is not the relevance of the choice of
the asset buyer, but the impact of divestiture on the upstream eﬀect of the ED.
16Outsiders always benefit from a price-increasing horizontal merger, and this is all the more
true for Cournot competitors, who in addition gain market shares. By selling assets, insiders
get partly "paid" for the change in market structure that the merger brings about.
17Intuitively, if the divestiture yields a higher payoﬀ than an anticompetitive 3-firm merger,
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Remark 1. Our assumptions define a non void set of parameter values - see the
Appendix for an explicit example consistent with this framework and also with
all additional assumptions.
2.3. The game
We give next the timing of the game between the CA and the merging firms,
which are randomly selected by nature.
At the first stage, the CA chooses to allow or not the ED, following the
decision rules above specified. At the same time, it decides on the type of blocking
decision, i.e. applying or not a remedy. The CA credibly commits to a given
decision rule by making it public under the form of merger guidelines, which
become binding from that moment on.
At the second stage, firms decide whether to undertake or not the eﬀort
to achieve EG. The CA does not observe the eﬀort decision.
At the third stage, firms notify to the CA a merger of either two or three
partners.
At the fourth stage, the exogenous signal is generated and publicly ob-
served. The merger is then cleared or blocked, according to the selected decision
rule.
The rest of the paper compares the decision rules in order to conclude on the
opportunity and the optimal design of the ED procedure. The comparison will be
performed depending on whether the CA requires or not remedy when challenging
a merger. A backwards induction through the game is necessary, and we begin by
discussing the outcome of the ED procedure.
3. Optimal design of the Eﬃciency Defence: to remedy or
not to remedy?
There is no strategic move at the last stage of the game, therefore the discussion
begins with the firms’ choice of merger. At stage 3, the insiders decide to submit
either a 3-firm merger or a 2-firm one, depending on the respective expected
payoﬀs. The following lemma presents the merger notification trade-oﬀ:
Lemma 1. For any σ, there exist and bΠr (σ) and eΠr (σ) such that:
then both the CA and the insiders prefer the remedy. But in that case, the discussion on the
merger choice is no longer relevant.
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(i) for Πr < bΠr (σ), only 2-firm mergers are notified;
(ii) for bΠr (σ) ≤ Πr < eΠr (σ), only eﬃcient insiders notify a 3-firm merger;
(iii) for eΠr (σ) ≤ Πr, only 3-firm mergers are notified.
Moreover, bΠr (σ) decreases with σ and eΠr (σ) increases with σ.
See proof in the Appendix.
Explicitly, the choice of merger notification gives rise to the following trade-oﬀ.
On the one hand, a 2-firm merger leads to a risk free profit, given that this merger
is always approved. On the other hand, a 3-firm merger is more profitable, but it
involves a risk: if it is rejected by the CA, the firm only earns the reservation profit
Πr. Actually, the lower the reservation profit, the higher the risk incurred (or,
equivalently, the higher the opportunity cost). Thus whenever the reservation
profit is high, the ineﬃcient as well as the eﬃcient insiders submit the 3-firm
merger, and the notification outcome is pooling. Instead, with a lower reservation
profit, the ineﬃcient insiders prefer to submit a 2-firm merger, and hence the
separation of merger submissions. Finally, the reservation profit can be so low,
that even the eﬃcient insiders shun the risky 3-firm merger, and in that case, only
2-firm notifications occur.
Naturally, the risk incurred also depends on the signal quality. The ineﬃcient
insiders are more reluctant to run the risk of a 3-firm merger the more accurate the
signal, therefore the relevant threshold eΠr increases with σ. By the same token,
a better signal reduces the risk incurred by the eﬃcient insiders when notifying
a 3-firm merger. As a result, the threshold bΠr (σ) below which eﬃcient insiders
submit a 2-firm merger decreases with σ.
In short, there are basically two sources of separation of types following the
merger notification: either the reservation profit is not too high, or the quality of
information is good.
Turning now to the previous, eﬀort provision stage, let G (σ;Πr) denote the
gross expected benefit from exerting eﬀort. This function writes:
G (σ;Πr) =



0, if Πr < bΠr
σ ·Π (3e; 1) + (1− σ) ·Πr − (Π (2; 1; 1) +Π (1; 2; 1)) , if bΠr (σ) < Πr < eΠr (σ)
σ ·Π (3e; 1)− (1− σ) ·Π (3; 1) + (1− 2σ) ·Πr, if Πr > eΠr
Basically, the G function summarizes the incentive to exert eﬀort, and firms
make the choice to achieve or not the EG based on the comparison between G
and the sunk cost F . The intuition is straightforward. First of all, whenever
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only 2-firm mergers are submitted, it goes without saying that the ED leads to
no eﬀort provision. In turn, with separating notifications, firms have incentives to
exert eﬀort iﬀ the expected profit exceeds that of a 2-firm merger. Similarly, in
case of pooling merger notifications, the incentive to undertake eﬀort is given by
the expected profit diﬀerential between the eﬃcient and ineﬃcient 3-firm mergers.
Taking into account the two possible levels of the reservation profit following
a blocking decision of the CA, we can conclude on the eﬀort provision as shows
the following proposition:
Proposition 1. There exists σ∗ ∈
£
1
2
, 1
¤
such that for σ < σ∗, G(σ;Πr) <
G(σ;Πr) whereas for σ ≥ σ∗, G(σ;Πr) ≥ G(σ;Πr).
See proof in the Appendix.
In other words, for low quality signals, if eﬀort is exerted under the strict ED
(without remedy), then this is also the case for the flexible ED (with remedy),
whereas for high quality signals, if eﬀort is exerted with divestiture, then eﬀort is
also ensured without it. Thus, for σ < σ∗, the flexible ED is likely to be the only
means to give eﬀort incentives, whereas for σ > σ∗, the strict ED is more likely
to ensure eﬀort provision.
Basically, this proposition deals with the type of merger control that provides
the highest eﬀort incentives, depending on the quality of information available.
Moreover, it conforms with the standard result in Moral Hazard frameworks,
where the agent is guaranteed a higher payoﬀ when information is poor, whereas
with better information the principal achieves incentive provision more easily, and
the agent is left with a lower reservation payoﬀ. In this respect, note that the eﬀort
incentive function G increases with the signal quality, so basically, for low quality
signals, to exert eﬀort insiders need a higher payoﬀ, whereas for better quality
signals, a lower payoﬀ will still provide eﬀort incentives.
The intuition goes as follows. If the signal is of poor quality, the status-quo
profit Πr makes very likely the pooling on 2-firmmergers on the one hand, whereas
the high reservation profit Πr makes likely the pooling on 3-firm ones. Between
the two, the highest (actually, non zero) eﬀort incentives occur in the latter case.
Besides, even if a not too low Πr, guarantees the separation of merger notifica-
tions, the expected cost for the eﬃcient insiders is high, because of the low signal
accuracy. The remedy lowers this cost, so it enhances the eﬀort incentive18. If the
18This can formally be seen in the expression of the eﬀort incentive function G, since the latter
is increasing with the reservation profit on the separating interval
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signal quality is good, Πr ensures the separation of merger submissions, whereas
Πr can still involve pooling notifications. However, the highest expected profit
diﬀerential between making eﬀort and not making eﬀort occurs on the separation
range19.
It follows that with a quite good signal, i.e. for a low error probability, the CA
will be able to safely increase the cost of a merger refusal by imposing a low reser-
vation profit Πr = Πr, while still giving incentives to undertake the costly eﬀort.
It may seem trivial, and then again it may not. Note that here the signal quality
and the merger prohibition cost born by insiders are complementary, whereas the
optimal punishment theory20 typically concludes on the substitutability between
the amount of the fine and the punishment probability. Increasing the latter is
costly for the principal, and since the agent only responds to the expected fine,
it is preferable to increase the amount of penalty to its upper bound. Here, we
identify a situation where they are complements, although we do acknowledge the
exogeneity of the detection probability. When the latter is rather low, the only
way for the CA to ensure eﬀort provision is to allow firms to enjoy a higher reser-
vation profit. In turn, when the signal quality improves, the threat of a return
to the status-quo is less and less likely to deter firms from attempting the costly
eﬀort, so the CA might safely use this threat and thus cancel all risk of a price
raise.
4. Optimal merger control: Eﬃciency Defence or No Eﬃ-
ciency Defence?
So far we have dealt with the optimal design of the ED. However, we equally
intend to address the CA’s choice between the ED and the NoED decision rules.
For that we need first establish the following result:
Lemma 2. For a given eﬀort decision the divestiture is Pareto-dominant; thus,
requiring remedy is a weakly dominant strategy for the CA.
The proof is actually straightforward. Whatever the firms’ decision w.r.t. the
costly eﬀort, the CA is better oﬀ by requiring remedy when turning down a merger,
since this would lower the price more. In turn, from the insiders’ point of view, the
19Note that the eﬀort incentive function G is decreasing with the reservation profit over the
3-firm pooling interval.
20See Becker (1968) for instance.
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divestiture represents a higher reservation profit than the status-quo. Moreover,
requiring divestiture and thereby granting insiders a higher reservation payoﬀ is
actually not costly for the CA, since unlike a typical Principal-Agent model, the
"rent transfer" does not take place here between the CA and the merging firms,
but between the outsider and the merging firms.
To explicit the above result, we detail the reasoning in the case of the strict
merger control without an ED. Under this NoED decision rule, 3-firm mergers are
always rejected, whatever the exogenous signal about the EG, therefore firms never
undertake the costly eﬀort. However, they may yet choose the type of merger to
notify. If the CA does not allow remedies, it is trivial to conclude that this decision
rule leads only to 2-firm merger notifications. In turn, if the CA challenges all
3-firm mergers by requiring the mandatory divestiture, then the insiders choose
to notify such a merger iﬀ the ensuing reservation profit exceeds that of a 2-firm
merger. By requiring divestiture the CA obtains at worst P (2, 1, 1), and at best
P (2, 2), therefore the remedy is weakly dominant.
Having thus established the optimality of divestiture for a given eﬀort level,
we go on now to address the choice of type of merger control to apply, namely
the optimal mix of remedy and ED. Given the CA’s objective of maximizing Con-
sumers’ Surplus, the issue is settled by the expected post-merger price. Assume
henceforth that Πr ≥ Π (2; 1; 1) +Π (1; 2; 1), which is a suﬃcient condition ensur-
ing both a non-ambiguous price comparison and that F ∈
£
G(1
2
;Πr), G(1;Πr)
¤
.
The following proposition gives the CA’s optimal merger control policy:
Proposition 2. (I) If F is low, i.e. F ≤ G(σ∗; ·), there exists σ1(F ), σ1 ∈
£
1
2
, σ∗
¤
such that: (i) for 1
2
≤ σ < σ1, the optimal merger control consists in remedy
without ED; (ii) for σ1 ≤ σ, the optimal policy consists in the flexible ED.
(II) If F is high, i.e. F ≥ G(σ∗; ·), there exist σ2(F ) and σ3(F ) ∈ [σ∗, 1] such
that: (i) for σ < σ2, the optimal policy consists in remedy without ED; (ii) for
σ2 ≤ σ < σ3, the optimal merger control is either remedy without ED, or the
strict ED; (iii) for σ3 ≤ σ ≤ 1, the optimal policy consists in the flexible ED.
To prove this, it is enough to sketch graphically the four relevant points
G(1
2
;Πr), G(12 ;Πr), G(1;Πr) and G(1;Πr) and also diﬀerent levels of F in the
(σ;G) space. In the Appendix we compute the expressions of the corresponding
expected prices.
The intuition runs as follows. When the eﬀort cost is low, the policy threshold
is unique: as soon as the eﬀort incentives provided by the ED exceed the cost
of eﬀort, the CA is better oﬀ allowing the ED, otherwise, the NoED applies.
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Equally important, the CA always require remedy in this case21. Indeed, as shown
by Proposition 1, when applying the ED for poor quality signals, the highest
incentives are provided by adding remedy. To put it short, with low quality signals,
there is basically no trade-oﬀ facing the CA, since the remedy does provide the
highest eﬀort incentive, so the first best is indeed achieved when the eﬀort cost is
low.
In turn, when F is high, the relevant signals are of good quality, and in this
case, the remedy no longer yields the highest eﬀort provision incentive, as seen in
Proposition 1. The optimal merger policy involves now two distinct thresholds.
The first one is given by the same trade-oﬀ as before, since as long as the ED does
not ensure eﬀort, the NoED with remedy is preferred. The second threshold comes
from a diﬀerent trade-oﬀ, to the extent that above it the flexible ED (with remedy)
provides suﬃcient incentives for eﬀort to actually occur. Remember though that
for σ ≥ σ∗, the highest eﬀort incentives are provided by the strict ED. Yet we have
seen that applying remedy is preferred by both the insiders and the CA, because
for the latter, not requiring a divestiture bears a cost, namely not lowering the
price as much as possible. Thus, with a high eﬀort cost and below σ3, the CA
faces a conflict between either giving incentives through the strict ED, or lowering
more the price through the remedy without ED. The comparison is eventually
settled by the actual price levels. Above σ3, however, the flexible ED is enough
to ensure eﬀort, despite the fact that the highest incentives are still given by the
strict ED. The previous conflict no longer exists, since the most preferred merger
control, i.e. with remedy, does ensure eﬀort.
This proposition deals with the impact of remedy on the design of the optimal
merger control. Divestiture and ED appear to be mostly complementary, except
for a high eﬀort cost range, where they are substitutes, due to the conflict between
incentive provision and the cost of not applying remedy. Basically, for a low eﬀort
cost, remedy always applies, either with or without the ED procedure. Without
the latter, the divestiture allows the implementation of a lower price through its
corrective role, whereas combined with the ED, it ensures the eﬀort incentive,
precisely because of the poor signals that are relevant for low F . With higher
eﬀort cost though, the remedy may not be optimal, namely in the case where
only the strict ED ensures eﬀort. However, with very good signals, the flexible
ED can become again optimal, but not through the eﬀort-incentive eﬀect, but
because it lowers more the price in case of a detection error on behalf of the CA.
21Note with this repect that for the low eﬀort costs, the poor quality signals are relevant,
simply because the incentive function G is increasing with the signal quality.
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To sum up, the divestiture appears complementarity to the ED either through
its eﬀort incentive provision or its capacity to minimize the error cost for the
CA. Moreover, the remedy can only conflict with the ED when it no longer gives
the highest eﬀort incentives. From a Moral Hazard point of view, over the [σ2, σ3]
range the First Best cannot be achieved, because the CA faces a trade-oﬀ between
giving incentives and incurring the corresponding cost22.
5. Conclusion
This paper deals with both the opportunity and the design of the ED proce-
dure. The former purpose is tackled from a diﬀerent perspective, to the extent that
the European ED was long delayed by the costly implementation issues, whereas
here we argue that its upstream incentive to encourage more eﬃcient mergers
should equally be accounted for, despite the asymmetric information problem. In
addition to the opportunity to allow or not the ED, we also addressed the issue
of adding divestiture to the trade-oﬀ. We analyzed the impact of remedy on the
outcome of the ED, and concluded on the design of merger control in terms of
optimal mix of divestiture and ED.
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Appendix
Explicit example. Consider the linear demand P = a − Q, where P is the
market price and Q is the total output, and the following constant marginal cost
function: c(K) = x · 1K , where K is the capital owned by the firm, and x is a
parameter measuring the use of this capacity. This formal expression is inspired
by Vasconcelos (2005). Marginal cost is decreasing with individual capacity, but
the latter can be used more or less eﬃciently.
The assumptions made in our model are consistent with this cost function for
the following specification: let the individual cost of a stand-alone firm before
merger be c(1) = 1k , where k is the individual indivisible capacity. After a 2-
firm merger, the mergerd firm’s marginal cost is c(2) = γ 1
2k , whereas the cost of a
outsider is unchanged, equal to c(1). After a 3-firm merger, the cost of the merged
entity is 0 if eﬀort is made, and equal to c(3) = δ 1
3k without eﬀort.
The assumptions on prices write now as follows:
P (3, 1) > Pi ⇔ δ > 21−6ak5 , Pi > P (2, 1, 1) ⇔ γ <
12−2ak
5
, P (2, 1, 1) >
P (3e, 1)⇔ γ > 2ak−4
3
, P (2, 2) < P (2, 1, 1)⇔ Pi > P (2, 1, 1), P (2, 2) > P (3e, 1)⇔
γ > 1. Checking for positive quantities before merger ⇔ ak > 1, so in all
the restrictions needed on parameters are simply δ > 21−6ak
5
, γ ∈
¡
1; 12−2ak
5
¢
,
ak ∈ (1; 3.5).
To make sure that the rest of hypotheses define a non void set, we check
profitability for some specific values of ak, γ and δ. More precisely, for ak =
2, γ = 1.5 and δ = 2, we have that Π (3; 1) > Πr, Πr > Π (2; 1; 1) + Π (1; 2; 1)
and Π (2; 1; 1) + Π (1; 2; 1) > 3Πi. Hence, our framework is consistent in the
neighbourhood of these values.
Proof of Lemma 1. Eﬃcient insiders notify a 3-firm merger iﬀ σ · Π (3e; 1) +
(1− σ) ·Πr ≥ Π (2; 1; 1) +Π (1; 2; 1). Define bΠr (σ) as the reservation profit level
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that satisfies with equality the above condition. Therefore, eﬃcient insiders always
submit a 3-firm merger provided that Πr ≥ bΠr (σ).
Similarly, ineﬃcient insiders notify a 3-firm merger iﬀ (1−σ)·Π (3; 1)+σ ·Πr ≥
Π (2; 1; 1) + Π (1; 2; 1). Denote now the relevant threshold as eΠr (σ), hence for
Πr ≥ eΠr (σ), only 3-firm mergers get notified, since straightforward computation
shows that eΠr (σ) > bΠr (σ), due to Π (3e; 1) > Π (3; 1).
Proof of Proposition 1. Compare G(1
2
;Πr) and G(12 ;Πr) - For σ =
1
2
, the
incentive constraints for the merger choice of the eﬃcient and ineﬃcient insiders
write respectively 1
2
Π (3e; 1)+ 1
2
Πr ≶ Π (2; 1; 1)+Π (1; 2; 1) and 12Π (3; 1)+ 12Πr ≶
Π (2; 1; 1) +Π (1; 2; 1). Hence, G(1
2
;Πr) =


0, if Πr < bΠr ¡12¢ [pooling on 2-firm mergers]
1
2
Π (3e; 1) + 1
2
Πr − (Π (2; 1; 1) +Π (1; 2; 1)) , if bΠr ¡12¢ < Πr < eΠr ¡12¢ [separation]
1
2
Π (3e; 1)− 1
2
Π (3; 1) , if eΠr ¡12¢ < Πr [pooling on 3-firm mergers]
Since Πr > Πr, G(12 ;Πr) is obtained by simply replacing Πr with Πr. We have
straightforwardly G(1
2
;Πr)−G(12 ;Πr) ≥ 0.
Compare G(1;Πr) and G(1;Πr) - For σ = 1, eﬃcient insiders necessar-
ily submit a 3-firm merger whatever the reservation profit, because their incen-
tive constraint becomes Π (3e; 1) > Π (2; 1; 1) + Π (1; 2; 1), which holds thanks to
merger profitability. In turn, ineﬃcient insiders only submit a 3-firm merger if
Πr ≥ Π (2; 1; 1)+Π (1; 2; 1). Since Πr < Π (2; 1; 1)+Π (1; 2; 1) by the profitability
assumption, G(1;Πr) coresponds to the gross incentive to exert eﬀort with sep-
arating notifications, and thereby G(1;Πr) = Π (3e; 1)− (Π (2; 1; 1) +Π (1; 2; 1)).
At the same time, G(1;Π) is equal either to Π (3e; 1)− (Π (2; 1; 1) +Π (1; 2; 1)), if
Πr < Π (2; 1; 1) + Π (1; 2; 1), or to Π (3e; 1) − Πr, if Πr ≥ Π (2; 1; 1) + Π (1; 2; 1).
In either case, it is straightforward to check that G(1;Πr) ≥ G(1;Πr).
Conclusion - Since G(1
2
;Πr) ≤ G(12 ;Πr) and G(1;Πr) ≥ G(1;Πr), and G is
obviously increasing with σ, there exists a threshold σ∗ such that G(σ∗;Πr) =
G(σ∗;Πr), q.e.d.
Expected prices and optimal policy.
• To show that F ∈ £G(1
2
;Πr), G(1;Πr)
¤
, we check that the constraint on
F , i.e. F ≥ Π (3e, 1) − Π (3, 1) is not contradicted on this interval. Since
G(1
2
;Πr) equals 12Π (3e; 1) −
1
2
Π (3; 1) for Πr ≥ Π (2; 1; 1) + Π (1; 2; 1), we
have directly that the Π (3e, 1) − Π (3, 1) ≥ G(1
2
;Πr). In turn, G(12 ;Πr) =
Π (3e; 1)− (Π (2; 1; 1) +Π (1; 2; 1)), so G(1
2
;Πr) ≥ Π (3e, 1)−Π (3, 1) .
19
• When the strict ED ensures eﬀort, the expected price is σP (3e; 1)+(1− σ)Pi,
whereas if the flexible ED ensures eﬀort, the expected price is lower: σP (3e; 1)+
(1− σ)P (2, 2). Therefore, if only the strict ED guarantees eﬀort, the CA
needs to compare the corresponding price σP (3e; 1) + (1− σ)Pi with the
one following remedy without ED: P (2, 2).
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